Visual cryptography schemes allow the encoding of a secret image, consisting of black or white pixels, into n shares which are distributed to the participants. The shares are such that only qualified subsets of participants can 'visually' recover the secret image. The secret pixels are shared with techniques that subdivide each secret pixel into a certain number m, m ≥ 2 of subpixels. Such a parameter m is called pixel expansion. Recently Yang introduced a probabilistic model. In such a model the pixel expansion m is 1, that is, there is no pixel expansion. The reconstruction of the image however is probabilistic, meaning that a secret pixel will be correctly reconstructed only with a certain probability. In this paper we propose a generalization of the model proposed by Yang. In our model we fix the pixel expansion m ≥ 1 that can be tolerated and we consider probabilistic schemes attaining such a pixel expansion. For m = 1 our model reduces to the one of Yang. For big enough values of m, for which a deterministic scheme exists, our model reduces to the classical deterministic model. We show that between these two extremes one can trade the probability factor of the scheme with the pixel expansion. Moreover, we prove that there is a one-to-one mapping between deterministic schemes and probabilistic schemes with no pixel expansion, where contrast is traded for the probability factor.
INTRODUCTION
A visual cryptography scheme for a set P of n participants is a method to encode a secret image into n shadow images in the form of transparencies, called shares, where each participant in P receives one share. Certain subsets of participants, called qualified sets, can 'visually' recover the secret image, but other subsets of participants, called forbidden sets, have no information on the secret image. A 'visual' recovery for a set X ⊆ P consists of stacking the shares (transparencies) given to the participants in X. The participants in a qualified set X will be able to see the secret image without any knowledge of cryptography and without performing any cryptographic computation. Forbidden sets of participants will have no information on the secret image.
This cryptographic paradigm was introduced by Naor and Shamir [1] . They analyzed the case of (k, n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes, in which a black and white secret image is visible if, and only if, any k transparencies are stacked together.
In the shared representation each secret pixel is transformed into a certain number m of pixels. The number m is called pixel expansion (the reconstructed shared image becomes m times bigger than the original). The 'quality' of the reconstructed image depends both on the pixel expansion and on the contrast, which is another measure of the goodness of the scheme. A number of papers studying the best pixel expansion and the best contrast have appeared in the literature. A partial list of such papers include [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] . Some other papers have focused on different models or properties. For example, in [9] , visual cryptography schemes for general access structures (where the qualified set of participants are arbitrary and not defined by a threshold of participants) have been studied. Schemes where the shares show meaningful pictures (not related to the secret) are studied in [10] . In [11] the problem of not distorting the original image is considered. Some research has also considered the case of colored images (see for example [12, 13, 14, 15] ).
Recently Yang [16] has introduced a new model of visual cryptography in which the reconstruction of the secret image is probabilistic. The deterministic model used in previous work, subdivides each secret pixel into a number m of subpixels. Hence the reconstructed image is m times bigger than the original one. In Yang's model there is no pixel expansion. Each pixel is reconstructed with a single pixel. However, while in the deterministic model the reconstruction of an approximation of the secret pixel is guaranteed, in Yang's probabilistic model the secret pixel is correctly reconstructed with some probability. Yang is to provide schemes with no pixel expansion, which are obviously desirable. However the quality of the reconstructed pixel depends on how big the probabilities is of correctly reconstructing secret pixels. In a deterministic scheme we pay with a certain pixel expansion the fact that the reconstruction is guaranteed. In a probabilistic scheme we pay for a reconstruction with no pixel expansion with a (small) probability of making mistakes in reconstructing the secret image. In some cases we may want a trade-off: we are willing to sacrifice some pixel expansion in order to improve the probabilistic reconstruction of the secret image or vice versa. In this paper we propose a generalization of the probabilistic model and show how we can trade pixel expansion for the probability of a good reconstruction. Our model can be seen as a generalization of both the classical deterministic model and the probabilistic model introduced by Yang [16] . Moreover, we show that there exists a one-to-one mapping between probabilistic schemes with no expansion and deterministic schemes; such a mapping trades the contrast of the deterministic scheme with the probability factor of the probabilistic scheme.
THE MODEL
The secret image consists of black and white 2 pixels. In order to share each pixel of the secret image the owner of the secret, usually called the dealer, provides each participant with a share, which is an enlarged version of the secret pixel consisting of a certain number m of subpixels. Notice that the term 'subpixel' is misleading since a pixel is the smallest unit we can control on an image and thus we cannot further divide the pixel into subpixels. So the shared version of the original secret pixel will consists of m pixels, which are called subpixels because all together they represent the original secret pixel.
The shares can be conveniently represented with n × m matrices where each row represents one share, i.e. m subpixels, and each element is either 0, for a white subpixel, or 1 for a black subpixel. A matrix representing the shares is called distribution matrix. Physically, the shares are given out in the form of printed transparencies. Given a distribution matrix M and a set Q of participants, the notation M Q refers to the submatrix of M consisting of only the rows corresponding to participants in Q.
To reconstruct the secret image a group of participants stacks together the shares. Since each secret pixel is represented by m pixels in the shares, the reconstructed image will be bigger than the original (depending on m and on the actual positions of the pixels, the image can also be distorted; a perfect square is a good choice for m because it avoids distortion). Depending on the stacked shares, each secret pixel will be reconstructed with a certain number of black and white subpixels. A reconstructed pixel is considered white if the number of white pixels in its reconstruction is big enough, i.e. the number of black subpixels is less than or equal to a given threshold , and is considered black if the number of black subpixels is big enough, i.e. greater than or equal to a given threshold h. Obviously one has to require that < h. We will call and h the contrast thresholds of the scheme. 3 Since a reconstructed pixel has to be either black or white, we consider only schemes such that in the reconstructed image each reconstructed pixel has a number of black pixels which is either ≤ or ≥h. In order to obtain such a property we assume that = h − 1.
We consider threshold schemes where a qualified set of participants consists of k or more participants. For these schemes, a non-qualified set of participants, i.e. a set of less than k participants, will not have any information about the secret image from the shares. Instead, a qualified set of participants, i.e. a set of at least k participants will be able to reconstruct the secret image. The quality of the reconstructed image depends on the scheme.
In a deterministic scheme the quality of the reconstructed image depends on the so-called contrast which is a function of the pixel expansion m, and the contrast thresholds and h. The contrast of a scheme is defined as γ
In a deterministic scheme it is guaranteed that, for any qualified set of participants, the pixel is reconstructed correctly; that is, if the secret pixel is white then the number of black subpixels in the reconstructed image, corresponding to that secret pixel, is at most , whereas if the secret pixel is black, the number of black subpixels in the reconstructed pixel is at least h.
In order to provide shares to the participants the dealer chooses uniformly at random a distribution matrix from a collection of matrices C B , if the secret pixel is black, or from a collection of matrices C W , if the secret pixel is white. Hence for a deterministic scheme it holds that for any distribution matrix M of the set C B , the reconstruction of a pixel obtained by M Q for any qualified set Q, gives at least h black subpixels, whereas for any distribution matrix M of the set C W the reconstruction of a pixel obtained by M Q for any qualified set Q, gives at most black subpixels.
In a probabilistic scheme the above property is guaranteed only with a certain probability. This means that not all the distribution matrices satisfy the above properties. For a probabilistic scheme, as done in [16] , we define p w|w (Q) , where Q is a qualified set of participants, as the probability of correctly reconstructing a white pixel when superimposing the shares of Q, and p b|w (Q) as the probability of incorrectly reconstructing a white pixel. Notice that p w|w (Q) = z/|C W | where z is the number of distribution matrices M in C W for which M Q reconstructs a pixel with at most black subpixels; also p b|w (Q) = z/|C W | where z is the number of distribution matrices M in C W for which M Q reconstructs a pixel with at least h black subpixels. Similarly we define p b|b (Q) and p w|b (Q) .
Hence give a measure of how good is the scheme for the given qualified set Q: the bigger the above differences are the better is the scheme, with the extreme case of both differences being 1 for all qualified sets, in which case we have a deterministic scheme. We say that a scheme is β-probabilistic if there exists a positive constant β such that for any qualified set Q it holds
Notice that when every reconstructed pixel is either white or black, that is the reconstructed pixel has at most black subpixels or at least h black subpixels, we have that for any Q, p w|w (Q) = 1 − p b|w (Q) and that p b|b (Q) = 1 − p w|b (Q), and thus
If a scheme, for some qualified set Q, reconstructs a secret pixel with a number of black subpixels strictly > and strictly <h, then the reconstructed pixel is neither white nor black. In this case the value p b|b (Q) − p b|w (Q) might be different from p w|w (Q) − p w|b (Q) . Recall that we only consider schemes with = h − 1, so we will always have
A scheme is characterized by several parameters: the number of participants n, the threshold k that determines whether a set of participants is qualified to reconstruct the image, the pixel expansion m and the contrast thresholds and h, which determine whether a reconstructed pixel is considered white or black. For a probabilistic scheme we have a further parameter: the probabilistic factor β that characterizes the probabilistic nature of the scheme. In the rest of the paper we will refer to all these parameters (that is β, k, n, , h and m) as the characteristic parameters of the scheme.
In the following we provide the definition of a β-probabilistic threshold visual cryptography scheme with characteristic parameters (k, n, , h, m), for short β-probabilistic (k, n, , h, m)-vcs. The definition naturally extends also to general access structures. 
Notice that the definition of the scheme requires the reconstruction of a secret pixel (Property (i)) to be well defined for qualified sets of exactly k participants. This is without loss of generality, because if a qualified set has more than k participants one can simply choose k of the shares and use only those k shares to reconstruct the image. Hence, throughout the paper we implicitly assume that a qualified set consists of exactly k participants. Occasionally we may write (k, n)-vcs when we want to specify only the threshold k and the number of participants n.
The goodness of a scheme is measured by the pixel expansion m, the contrast γ = (h − )/m and by the probabilistic factor β.
Notice that for m = 1 the above definition is equivalent to the one provided by Yang [15] . Whereas for a big enough m, we can construct schemes with β = 1; in such a case, the above definition is equivalent to the classical definition of a visual cryptography scheme.
If we think of the pixel expansion m as a parameter, on one extreme (m = 1) we get the probabilistic model with no pixel expansion, and on the other extreme (m big enough) we obtain the deterministic model. In between such two extremes one can consider probabilistic models with a given pixel expansion, trading the probability of a good reconstruction with the number of subpixels required to reconstruct each secret pixel.
Base matrices. In many schemes, the collection C W (resp. C B ) consists of all the matrices that can be obtained by permuting all the columns of a matrix M W (resp. M B ). For such schemes, the matrices M W and M B are called the base matrices of the scheme.
CANONICAL THRESHOLD SCHEMES
In this section we show that, without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to particular threshold schemes. We call canonical β-probabilistic (k, n, , h, m)-vcs schemes those schemes that satisfy the following properties:
(i) the cardinality of the collections C W and C B are equal and; (ii) for any two qualified sets Q 1 and Q 2 of participants, we have that p x|y (Q 1 ) = p x|y (Q 2 ), for x ∈ {w, b} and y ∈ {w, b}.
Next, we show that restricting our attention to canonical threshold schemes is without loss of generality with respect to the characteristic parameters of the scheme. The first lemma says that given a probabilistic scheme S we can always construct a scheme S such that the cardinality of C W (S ) is the same as that of C B (S ) and such that S has the same characteristic parameters as S.
The following lemma is similar to the analogous result proved in Section 2.1 of [9] for deterministic schemes. (otherwise we can choose S = S and we are done). Let r = r 1 · r 2 and construct S by letting C W (S ) (resp. C B (S )) consists of all the matrices of C W (S) (resp. C B (S)) each one repeated r 2 (resp. r 1 ) times. It is obvious that
Lemma 3.1. Given a β-probabilistic (k, n, , h, m)-vcs S, there exists a β-probabilistic (k, n, , h, m)-vcs S such that |C W (S )| = |C B (S )|.

Proof. Fix a β-probabilistic (k, n, , h, m)-vcs S,
Since we have only repeated matrices of the collections C it is easy to see that k, n and m remain the same. Keeping the same and h β also stays the same; indeed C W (S ) is obtained by replicating the same number of times each matrix of C W (S) and thus the probabilities p w|w (Q) and p b|w (Q) do not change for any Q, and similarly for p w|b (Q) and p b|b (Q) since C B (S ) is obtained by replicating the same number of times each matrix of C B (S).
The following lemma shows that we can build schemes where the number of black subpixels in a reconstructed pixel does not depend on the particular qualified set of participants that we choose to reconstruct the secret pixel while maintaining the same characteristic parameters of the scheme.
Lemma 3.2. Given a β-probabilistic (k, n, , h, m)-vcs S, there exists a β-probabilistic (k, n, , h, m)-vcs S such that
for any two qualified sets Q 1 and Q 2 of participants, we have that p x|y (Q 1 ) = p x|y (Q 2 ), for x ∈ {w, b} and y ∈ {w, b}.
Proof. Fix a β-probabilistic (k, n, , h, m)-vcs S. Consider first C W (S) and assume that the desired property does not hold. Then we build a new scheme S where C W (S ) is obtained from C W (S) in the following way: for each matrix M of C W (S) insert into C W (S )
all the matrices that we can build from M by permuting in all possible n! ways its rows. The collection C B (S ) is obtained in the same way from C B (S).
Let Q 1 and Q 2 be two qualified sets. We have that C
W (S ); indeed, by construction both sets contain, for any qualified set Q, all the matrices in C Q W (S), with the same multiplicity (the multiplicity is due to the fact that when restricting the attention to the rows in Q, the other n − k rows can be taken in any order). Hence, we have that p w|w (Q 1 ) = p w|w (Q 2 ), and p b|w (Q 1 ) = p b|w (Q 2 ). For the same reason we have C
B (S ) and thus
By Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 it follows that considering only canonical schemes is without loss of generality, because for any scheme S we can always construct an equivalent canonical scheme S having the same characteristic parameters of scheme S.
In the rest of the paper we consider only canonical schemes. Remember that for a canonical scheme p x|y (Q 1 ) = p x|y (Q 2 ), for x ∈ {w, b} and y ∈ {w, b} and thus we will just write p x|y , without specifying the qualified set.
PROBABILISTIC SCHEMES WITH NO PIXEL EXPANSION
In this section we focus our attention on probabilistic threshold schemes that do not have pixel expansion, that is m = 1. In [16] it has been proved that a deterministic scheme S with contrast γ (S) can be transformed into a β-probabilistic scheme S with β(S ) = γ (S) and no pixel expansion. In this section we prove a complementary result stating that a β-probabilistic scheme S with no pixel expansion can be transformed into a deterministic scheme S with contrast γ (S ) = β(S). This implies that there is one-toone correspondence between the probabilistic model with no pixel expansion and the deterministic one where the contrast is traded for the probabilistic factor. The following lemma has been proved in [16] . 
(S).
Lemma 4.1 states that we can transform a deterministic scheme into a probabilistic one, provided that the deterministic scheme is a base matrices scheme. Next, we provide a more general version of the above lemma which allows transformation of any deterministic scheme into a probabilistic one (not just the ones that can be expressed with base matrices). Proof. Let S be a deterministic (k, n, , h, m)-vcs. Construct a probabilistic scheme S , by letting C B (S ) (resp. C W (S )) consist of all the n × 1 vectors that appear in all the matrices of C B (S) (resp. C W (S)).
We need to prove that S is a β-probabilistic (k, n, , h , m )-vcs scheme with = 0, h = 1, m = 1 and β = γ (S) = (h − )/m. Obviously S has pixel expansion m = 1. We set = 0 and h = 1 and we have to prove that this results in a β-probabilistic scheme.
Let r = |C B (S)|. By the properties of S, we know that when the secret pixel is black the reconstruction in S gives at least h black subpixels, that each matrix of C B (S) has at least h columns which reconstruct black. Hence, in S we have at least r · h columns that reconstruct black. Since Hence, in S we have that where c i X is the number of matrices of C X that provide a reconstruction, by any qualified set, of the secret pixel with exactly i black subpixels. The characteristic vectors are well defined because, by Property (ii) of canonical schemes, each c i X does not depend on the particular qualified set that we choose for reconstructing the secret pixel. Both C B (S) and C W (S) contain r matrices of dimension n × 1; hence, the dimension of both M B and M W is n × r; thus, m = r.
Since S is a β-probabilistic scheme, we have that p b|b − p b|w ≥ β > 0; hence p b|b > p b|w , and since p b|b = c 1 B /r and p b|w = c 1 W /r, we have c 1 B > c 1 W . Thus, < h . Now we need prove that the scheme is deterministic. Scheme S is a basis matrices scheme, so all the matrices of the collections C W (S ) and C B (S ) are equal up to a permutation of the columns; moreover, it is easy to see that a reconstructed black pixel always has h black subpixels and that a reconstructed white pixel always has black subpixels. Hence, we have p b|b = p w|w = 1 and p w|b = p b|w = 0. Hence, scheme S is deterministic.
Let us consider the security property. Fix a non-qualified set of participants and consider the corresponding k < k rows of the basis matrices. Each of these rows can be seen as the concatenations of shares of S [one per each matrix in the collections C B (S) and C W (S)]. By the security property of S we have that the k rows of M B are equal to the k rows of M W , except for a permutation of the columns. Hence S satisfies the security property.
Finally, the contrast of S is
An immediate consequence is that any bound on the contrast of a deterministic scheme is also a bound on the probabilistic factor of probabilistic schemes with no pixel expansion. For example, in [7] it has been proved that the contrast of any deterministic (k, n)-vcs is upper bounded by
As an immediate corollary of Lemma 4.3, we have the following lemma: For any β-probabilistic (k, n, 0, 1, 1 )-vcs we have that k − 1) ) .
PROBABILISTIC SCHEMES WITH ANY PIXEL EXPANSION
Lemma 4.3 shows that by using a large enough pixel expansion we can transform a probabilistic scheme into a deterministic one. At one extreme (no pixel expansion) we have a probabilistic scheme for which the reconstruction relies entirely on the probability factor of the scheme, while at the other extreme (deterministic schemes) we have a scheme for which the reconstruction is guaranteed but requires a certain pixel expansion. A scheme with no pixel expansion is clearly a desirable one; however, we may have to be content paying with a small probability factor. Hence, it is interesting to look for schemes in between these two extremes for which we can trade the probability factor for the pixel expansion.
Constructing probabilistic schemes with pixel expansion
In Lemma 4.3 we start with a probabilistic scheme with no pixel expansion and construct a deterministic scheme with pixel expansion equal to the cardinality r of the collections C B and C W of the probabilistic scheme. We can use the same technique to construct schemes with arbitrary pixel expansion m , with 1 < m ≤ r. The construction would be basically the same: build the new collections of matrices C B and C W by constructing in all possible ways matrices with m columns from the vectors of the collections C B and C W of the starting probabilistic scheme (in the particular case of m = r, the resulting scheme is deterministic). Notice that it is useless to construct probabilistic schemes with m > r, since for m = r we can get a deterministic scheme. 
(S)|. Construct a scheme S whose collection C B (S ) (resp. C W (S )) consists of all the matrices of dimension n×m that we can build by choosing m vectors of C B (S) (resp. C W (S)).
Notice that we also need to fix the contrast thresholds and h of the new scheme S . There can be several valid choices. We have two possible choices for the thresholds of S . For = 0 and h = 1 scheme S has p b|b = 1 and p b|w = 2/3. For = 1 and h = 2 scheme S has p b|b = 1/3 and p b|w = 0. In both cases we get a 1/3-probabilistic scheme. Although in this paper we consider only schemes with = h − 1, we notice that the case = 0 and h = 2 allows reconstructed pixels that cannot be classified either black or white. In such a scheme the probabilities of correctly reconstructing secret pixels are smaller (since some of the matrices are wasted with a reconstruction that is neither black nor white). We also remark that one could try to eliminate distribution matrices for which the reconstruction gives a number of black subpixels in the gap between and h ; however, it is not clear whether this can be done without violating the security property. In the particular case above, = 0 and h = 2 are clearly not possible (indeed we would have a perfect reconstruction of both white and black).
The Computer
We can use the matrices M B and M W consisting of all the columns of C B and C W to represent the new scheme S , since they give an efficient representation of the collections C B and C W ; clearly, together with M B and M W we need to specify the pixel expansion m and the thresholds and h .
As we have already noticed not all possible choices of the contrast thresholds are valid. In the above example we cannot set = 0 and h = 2. In order to set strictly smaller than h − 1 we need to make sure that no reconstructed pixel has a number of black subpixels in the gap between and h . 4 We recall here that in the this paper we consider schemes with = h − 1. Construction 5.1 starts from probabilistic schemes with no pixel expansion. Using Lemma 4.1 or Lemma 4.2 we can construct a probabilistic scheme with no pixel expansion starting from a deterministic scheme. Hence we can construct probabilistic schemes with pixel expansion starting from a deterministic scheme, applying first Lemma 4.1 and then Construction 5.1.
The security property of the new scheme
The probabilistic schemes obtained with Construction 5.1 satisfy the security property. Indeed, consider a non-qualified set Q of participants and let C Hence the security property for S holds.
The probabilities of the new scheme
In this section we provide a formula for the probabilities of the scheme built with Construction 5.1 as a function of the probabilities of the starting scheme.
Let S be a canonical probabilistic scheme with no pixel expansion and let p b|b , p b|w , p w|b and p w|w be the probabilities of S.
Fix an m and build a probabilistic scheme with pixel expansion m using Construction 5.1. Fix also a threshold , 0 ≤ < m . Fixing gives also h = + 1. We notice that, even with this restriction, not all choices of will result in valid schemes. Let r be the cardinality of the collections C W and C B of S.
The cardinality of the collections C W and C B , of scheme S , is r = r(r −1)×· · ·×(r −m +1) because we have r ways to choose the first column, r − 1 possible choices for the second and so on until the last column for which we have r − m + 1 possible choices. It is easy to see that r = m ! r m . (An explanation of this expression is that the binomial coefficient gives the number of possible ways of choosing m vectors among the r of the collections, and the factorial coefficient accounts for all the possible permutations for each choice.)
Fix a qualified set Q of participants. We want to compute p b|b (Q) . We need to count the number of matrices of C Q B (S) that yield a black reconstructed pixel. Notice that, for a qualified set, the number of matrices (vectors) C Q B (S) that would give the correct reconstruction of a black subpixel (i.e. a black pixel) is r · p b|b , while the remaining r − r · p b|b , would give a wrong reconstruction of a black secret pixel (i.e. .
Notice that when dealing with canonical schemes we have that the probabilities do not depend on the particular set Q. From Equations (2)- (5) we have that the probabilities of S do not depend on the particular qualified set Q; hence S is canonical.
In the next sections we apply the construction explained previously starting with some known deterministic schemes. Obviously, it is possible to apply the construction starting from other deterministic schemes. We leave this possibility as an open problem.
(n, n)-Threshold probabilistic schemes with any pixel expansion
In this section we build (n, n)-threshold probabilistic schemes with any pixel expansion, for n ≥ 2. The starting deterministic scheme S D that we use is the (n, n)-threshold deterministic scheme of Naor and Shamir [1] . We recall that S D has pixel expansion m = 2 n−1 , and thresholds = m − 1 and h = m. Moreover, the scheme consists of a white base matrix containing all vectors with an even (including 0) number of black subpixels and a black base matrix containing all vectors with an odd number of black Let S be the (n, n, 0, 0, 1)-vcs obtained applying Lemma 4.1 to scheme S D . For scheme S we have that the cardinality of the collections C B and C W is r = 2 n−1 , and that
Fix an m , 2 ≤ m ≤ r, and let S be the probabilistic scheme with pixel expansion m obtained using Construction 5.1 from scheme S. We need to choose the threshold for S (which gives also the threshold h since we only consider schemes with h = + 1). We observe that must be m −1 because there is only one column with all white pixels and thus we will never be able to get more than 1 white subpixel in a reconstructed pixel (equivalently we will always get at least m − 1 black subpixels in a reconstructed pixel). This implies that if we choose < m − 1 all reconstructed pixels will always be considered black and thus we cannot construct any scheme. So in order to construct schemes we have to fix = m − 1 and h = m . Now we want to compute the probabilistic factor of scheme S . First we look at p b|b . All the columns of the black base matrix M B of the deterministic scheme S D have at least a 1; hence, all columns of C B (S ) have at least a 1. Thus, we will always have m black subpixels when reconstructing a black secret pixel. This means that p b|b = 1 and p w|b = 0. Next, we compute p b|w . Now we need to look at the white base matrix M W of scheme S D which determines C W (S ). Since M W has one column with all 0s there will be some matrices of C W (S ) which include such a column. In order for a reconstructed pixel to be considered black it must have h = m black subpixels. Among the So, in this case there is a linear relation between the pixel expansion of the scheme and the probability factor. A probabilistic scheme with no pixel expansion implies a small probability factor (β = 1/r); we can increase the probability factor of the scheme by increasing the pixel expansion. Clearly for m = 2 n−1 one would get β = 1, that is, a deterministic scheme.
(2, n)-Threshold probabilistic schemes with any pixel expansion
In this section we build (2, n)-threshold probabilistic schemes with pixel expansion, for n ≥ 3. The starting deterministic scheme S D that we use is the (2, n)-threshold deterministic scheme of [5] . We recall that S D has pixel expansion m = Next we analyze two possible cases.
Case
= 0, h = 1. We want to compute p b|b . In this case a reconstructed pixel is black if at least one subpixel is black (and white otherwise). Fix any qualified set Q. By property PB, the matrices of the collection C Hence, for the (2, n)-threshold scheme obtained by choosing = 0 we have
.
We want to compute p b|b . In this case a reconstructed pixel is black if both subpixels are black (and white otherwise). Fix any qualified set Q. By property PB, the matrices of the collection C Hence, for the (2, n)-threshold scheme obtained by choosing = 1 we have
Next, we compare the value of β for the above two cases. We are interested in figuring out whether one case is better (bigger β) than the other. To do so we write the difference β 1 − β 0 as A simple analysis shows that the limit of β 1 as n approaches infinity is 5/16 0.31, while the limit of β 0 as n approaches infinity is 3/16 0.18. Figure 1 shows a plot of β 0 and β 1 for n up to 500.
(2, n)-Threshold for any m
In the case of any m we use Equations (2)-(5) to compute the probabilities of probabilistic schemes, over all choices of and h . Table 1 gives the resulting values of the probabilistic factor β of S over all possible choices of and m , for the case of n. Since for n = 3 scheme S D has m = 3, clearly for m = 3 we get a deterministic scheme; such a scheme is obtained for 
The max over each row is in boldface.
scheme is 0, meaning that no probabilistic scheme with pixel expansion m = 3 can be constructed with Construction 5.1. For the case of m = 2 we have that = 1 and = 2 are valid choices and they both yield a 1/3-probabilistic scheme. Table 2 gives the resulting values of the probabilistic factor β of S over all possible choices of and m , for the case of n = 4. Notice that for n = 4 scheme S D has m = 6, hence for m = 6 we get deterministic schemes (in this case both = 3 and = 4 yield a deterministic scheme). As we can see from the table, also for m = 5 we can get a deterministic scheme by choosing = 3. We recall that the starting scheme S D is not a minimal pixel expansion scheme. For the other possible choices of m , the table shows in boldface the biggest probabilistic factor β found.
Finally, Table 3 gives the resulting values of the probabilistic factor β of S over all possible choices of and m , for the case of n = 5. For the n = 5 scheme S D has m = 10, hence m can range from 2 to 10. As we can see from the table, we get deterministic schemes from m = 8 (in such a case, by choosing = 4). Again the best probabilistic factor found is reported in boldface. The max over each row is in boldface.
CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper we have introduced a generalization of the probabilistic model of Yang [16] . The probabilistic model of Yang considers visual cryptography schemes without pixel expansion; in such schemes the reconstruction of the secret pixel is probabilistic (i.e. the pixel is correctly reconstructed only with some probability). We introduced probabilistic schemes with pixel expansion, generalizing the model of Yang. We show that there is one-to-one correspondence between probabilistic schemes with no pixel expansion and deterministic schemes; such one-to-one mapping trades the probabilistic nature of the scheme with the contrast of the deterministic scheme. By considering probabilistic schemes with pixel expansion we pose the problem of trading the probabilistic nature of the scheme with the pixel expansion; we provide a general technique to construct probabilistic schemes with pixel expansion and we study their probabilistic factors.
We have given a construction for (n, n)-threshold schemes and proved that there is a linear relation between pixel expansion and the probabilistic factor. We also studied (2, n)-threshold schemes; for such schemes we were not able to provide a closed expression for the probabilistic factor. One can try to find such a closed expression if it exists. It would be interesting also to investigate the case 3 ≤ k < n.
Our schemes were built using some known black and white deterministic schemes as building blocks. One can study the probabilistic factor of schemes that can be obtained starting from other deterministic schemes or provide new constructions. Finally, we remark that one can devise other methods to build probabilistic schemes to trade the pixel expansion with the probabilistic factor.
An anonymous referee pointed us to reference [17] and suggested to use repeatedly Yang's scheme for each subpixel. Paper [17] proposes size-adjustable schemes using composition techniques of deterministic and probabilistic schemes. It would be interesting to explore such approaches and to provide an analytical comparison with our results.
